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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

DONALD RAY~fl1~R AND MluLERS'
~lUTli1\L INSURANCE ASSO~CIA
TION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

9996
vs.
Hl-LIXr~

TRANSPORT, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CAS·E
This is a second suit, filed after a trial and judg~
ment for plaintiff in the first law suit, seeking to recover
additional automobile property damages represented by
the subrogation interest of plaintiff insurer, who had
elected, prior to the first suit, not to have their interests
included in the first suit.
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DISPOSITION IN T,HE LOWER COURT
Based on stipulated facts, and written Memoranda
'
judgment was entered for defendant.

The facts are stipulated. and plaintiff's attempt to
enlarge, analyze, and argue the facts in his "STATEMENT OF: F AC,TS" is both misleading and erroneous.
For the convenience of the Court and in the interest
of accuracy, we quote the Stipulation of Facts (R-20-22)
as well as the pertinent exhibits referred to therein.
STIP'ULATION
,Comes now the plaintiffs by and through their attorney Glen M. Hatch and the defendant by and through
it~ ~ttorney, L. E. Midgley and with respect to the aboveentitled cause, stipulate that if proper witnesses were
called and testified at the time of trial, the following
facts would be found.
1. That defendant at all times pertinent to this
matter, was insured for public liability and property
damage liability by Central Casualty Company, an insurance company of Illinois, authorized to transact business in Utah. The Policy of Insurance, Exhibit "A"
is attached.

2. Homer Bray Service, Inc., of Evanston, Illinois,
was the General Agent for said insurance company and
Curtis and Brandley of Sa:lt Lake City, Utah were the
local agents.
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3. That said insurance was in force on May 17th,
l9ti0 "·hen planitiff Donald Raymer was involved in an
~ccident with defendant's truck.
4. That the plaintiff, Donald Raymer, on the date
llf said accident, was the owner of a 1960 Buick which
was insured 'vith Miller's Mutual Insurance Association,
an insurance company of Illinois; that said collision in~urance policy provided $50.00 deductible collision coverage; that the automobile sustained damages rendering
said automobile a total loss ; that Donald Raymer paid
$50.00 of said loss and Millers' Mutual Insurance Association paid $2,()42.00, the reasonable value of said vehicle,
after credit of salvage value being $2,692.00.

Plaintiff Donald Raymer suffered injuries in the
aforesaid accident and retained attorney Glen M. Hatch,
to represent him for the recovery of said damages as a
result of said injuries and his expenses, including his
$50.00 deductible.
5. Attorney Hatch, prior to filing suit, corresponded
with Millers' Mutual Insurance Association, notifying
said insurance company that he was about to commence
suit against the defendant, and asked if the claim of
Millers' Mutual Insurance Association for their subrogation interest should be included in said suit.
fi Millers' Mutual then wrote to Homer Bray Serv-

ice, Inc. (Exhibit "B")• and received a reply, (Exhibit

"C")••.
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•Exhibit "B" (R-20)
February 17, 1961
Homer Bray Service, Incorporated
P. 0. Box 1111
Evanston, Illinois
Attention: E. C. J obe
Vice President
Re : Donald M. Raymer
Policy No.: 4235 0847
D/A: May 17,1960
Subrogation Claim: 05 1434
Your File : 60361
Gentlemen:
We understand you are representing the Central
·Casualty Company who provides liability coverage under
their policy A-12'49·3 for the Hi-Line Transportation
Company, owners of the other vehicle involved in the
captioned accident. We understand also that both our
insured and his wife have presented injury claims as a
result of this accident and that you haven't yet· been
able to dispose of these injury cases.
Mr. Raymer's 1960 Buick was totally demolished in
this accident and we have made a· fairly substantial
payment to him under our collision coverage. Our investigation indicates the Hi-Line Transportation Company vehicle 'vas responsible for this accident and we
are therefore now looking to the Central Casualty Company for reimbursement covering our collision payment.
We would accordingly appreciate it if you will kindly
advise us whether Central Casualty will give due consideration to our subrogation clain1 after they have
disposed of our insureds' injury clailns. In the absence
of some assurance that Central Casualty \viii consider
our subrogation claiin after the other cases are out of
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the way we will naturally be forced to take other action
to prot~ct our interests.
Sincerely,
s/ J. W. Kelsey
Casualty Claims D·epartment.
• •Exhibit "C" (R-28)
February 22,"1961
(Dictated 2-20-61)

Mr. J. W. Kelsey
Casualty Claims Department ·
~tillers' ~lutual Insurance Association
320 Easton Street
Alton, Illinois

Re ~File No. 60-361
Insured: Hi-Line Transport
Your File: Subrogation Claim 05 1434
Clauuant: Donald M. Raymer
Dear Mr. Kelsey:
This will acknowedge receipt of your letter of February
17, 1961 and we shall appreciate receiving photostatic
copy of your proof of loss together with draft in payment.

You are correct. We have not been able to dispose of
the injury claims and when they are out of the way we
will certainly be more than happy to give your subrogation claiin consideration.
Thanking you for your cooperation, I am

Sincerely yours,
HOMER BRAY

SE.RVIC~E,

INC.

E. C. JOBE
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7. Based on the above correspondence, 'Millers'
Mutual wrote attorney Hatch advising that their subrogation interest should not be included in the lawsuit.
8. Attorney Hatch filed suit in the District Court
of the ·Third Judicial Ditsrict In and For Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, entitled Donald Raymer et al
Plaintiffs vs. Hi-Line Transport Inc., Civil No. 130117
in which plaintiff Raymer prayed for recvery of his
$50.00 deductible as well as other Special Damages and
General Damages for his personal injuries.
9. Trial of the aforesaid law suit in Salt Lake
County was held on October 3rd to 5th, 1961 which
resulted in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Raymer,
which judgment was fully paid and satisfied by Central
Casualty Company.
10. Neither Homer Bray Service, Inc., nor Central
Casualty Company at any time notified defendant HiLine ~Transport Inc., of any negotiations or arrangements concerning the subrogation interest of Millers'
Mutual Insurance Association.
11.· The understanding evidenced by the correspondence between Central Casualty Company and Millers' Mutual Insurance Association was that after the
conclusion of the personal injury action, in the event
plaintiff prevailed, Central Casualty would pay to ~fil
lers' Mutual the amount claimed by Millers' Mutual
under their subrogation rights.
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12. That the above understanding is based on a custorn nnd practice between insurance companies generally,
in fuetual situations where liability appears clear, for
the reasons :

(a) rrhe subrogation company saves attorneys fees
and <'Osts of collection.
(b) The Liability Company is thereby able to keep

the special damages in the personal injury action reduet\d by the extent of the omitted subrogation interest.
(<·) Reciprocity and comity between companies, in-

asinuch as in a later case, where the interests are
reversed, the benefits may be reversed.

13. After termination of the personal injury action
in the Third Judicial District and before filing the present la,vsuit, Central Casualty Company went into re:..
reivership and is now in receivership and the office of
Liquidator of Central Casualty Company was tendered
the defense of the present lawsuit, which defense was
refused. (Exhibit "E")
14. That no release, or other document was executed
by Plaintiff Raymer, specifically reserving the cause
of action represented by the subrogation interest of
Millers' Mutual.

15. That the collision on May 17th, 1960 was proxiInately caused by the negligence of the defendant; that
this plaintiff, Donald Raymer 'vas free from contributory negligence; that Defendant's negligence proximately
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caused the above mentioned damage to the Buick automobile of Plaintiff Donald Raymer.
Dated this 28th day of F·ebruary 19'63.

Js/ GLEN M.

H~TCH

Attorney for Plaintiffs
jsj L. E. MIDGLEY
Attorney for Defendant
POINT ONE
THE PRIOR LAW SUIT IS RES JUDICATA,
AND THE PRESENT SUIT IS BARRED AS AN ATTEMPT TO SPLIT A CAUSE OF ACTION.

The qusetion involved in this appeal may be stated
as follows:
MAY AN INSURER, WITH FULL KNO·WLEDGE
o~F IT S INSURED·'S SUIT FOR PERSONAL INJURIE~S AND PROPERTY DAMAGE, ELEC'T NO'T TO
HAvE· IITS SUBROGAT,ION IN'TERESTS INCLUDED IN ·THE SUIT BE:CAUSE OF A 8ECRET
AGREEME·N'T TO BE PAID AT A L~TER D'ATE
BY THE D·EFE.NDANT'S INSURER, FILE A SECOND· SUI'T AGAINS'T' THE DEFE,NDAN'T PERSONALLY, WHEN ·THE SOLE REASON FOR THE
BREACH O~F SAID AGREE,MENIT BY DEFENDANT
INS~URER wAS T'HE F AC'T 'THAT IT; BECAME INSOLVENT.
1

1
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It is erystal clear that in Utah, a single cause of
action may not be split, to permit two suits.

In Johansen v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114,
1:">~ P2d 98, after citing several jurisdictions holding with
the rule in Utah, states, at 152 P2d 103;
"These cases proceed upon the theory that
the insured is the trustee for the insurer and that
the third party has a right not to have the cause
of action against him split up so that he is compelled to defend two or more actions. ·This splitting of the cause of action is avoided by having
the suit brought in the name of the insured for
the benefit of himself as trustee for the insurance carrier. The principle of law is noted in
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. U.P.&R.G.R. Go., 44
utah 26, 137 p. 653."
This holding was again upheld, contrary to plaintiff's brief, in Cederloff v. Whited (1946) ilO Utili 45,
169 P2d 771, at pg. 780;
"As pointed out in the Johansen case,
(supra), even though the insurance company is
subrogated to a part of the claim of the plaintiff,
against the defendant, that does not create another cause of action and there can only be one
suit to recove'r on that cause of a.ction.'' (Emphasis added)
See also: Madsen v. Madsen, 72 Utah 96, 269 Pac.
132. Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 293,
25·4 Pac. 784. Sniith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah
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362, 179 Pac. 896. Chesney v. District
Court of Salt Lake County, 99 l;tah
513 (1941), 108 P·2d. 514.

In the c·ederloff case, the defendant contended that
the plaintiff, (insured), could only recover the deductible,
the balance having been assigned to plaintiff's insurer,
inasmuch as the defendant feared he could be again sued
in the subrogation action. 'This co~tention failed.
Bancroft Code Pleading, ·Ten Year Supplement, Sec.
384, Pg. 1512. characterizes the rule against splitting
as the "settled policy of the law"; and at S.ec. 289, Pg.
1512 states further,
"The rule against splitting a cause of action
cannot be avoided by making partial assignments."
The above Utah holdings are supported by the great
weight of authority.
Joyce v. Murphy Land Co., 35 Idaho 549, 208 Pac.
241. Iowa National v. Huntley, 78 Wyoming 380,
32 8P2'd 569. 29A Am. Jur. Sec. 1720, pg. 800.
62 ALR2d 977.
Even in Ohio, where the assignee is held to have a
separate cause- of action under some circumstances, the
Utah holding is upheld where the insurer had knowledge
of the first suit.
We are accused, in plaintiff's brief, of misquoting
Spargur v. Dayton Power and Light Co., 7 Ohio Ops 2d
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138, 15~ ~.E.~d 918, \vhich accusation is obviously erronmao~. \VhilP a reading of the case by the Court will
settle this ~ide controversy, we feel constrained to defend
ourst•lvl\~ herein.
lT nder Ohio procedure, four suits were filed as a
l'P~ult of an explosion, one for personal injuries, one for
medical expenses, and two for property damage to personalty u.nd realty, and the insurers joined in the property daruagP suits. While these cases were. pending, the
Ohio Supreme Court announced a new rule preventing
tlw splitting of a cause of action, but allowing an assignee to sue separately. !Two of the four cases were
tried (personal injury and medical), and judgment was
rendered in favor of several defendants. Those defendants then moved to dismiss the two property damage
cases as res judicata, estoppel by judgment, and splitting.
..:\ t page 927, the Court finds :

"The four motions of the defendants ... for
judgment on the pleadings is sustained ..."
At page 925 the Ohio Court states :
..The Court finds that the assignee of a claim
for property damage is in privity with the assignor and is bound by a final adjudication adverse to or in favor of the injured assignor in
a personal injury action." ·
A. reading of the case reveals that the Ohio c·ourt

based its findings on the law of privity, and estoppel.
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As to privity, the :Court states, at page 922:
"Privity is a succession of interest or relationship to the same thing whether created by
deed, by contract, by other act, or by operation
of law. Privity is dependent upon a succession
in interest. Hence, one who has succeeded to an
estate or interest is to that extent in privity with
his successor."
Page 924:
"·The rule of privity ... extends to the sound
rule of public policy of avoiding vexacious litigation. where the relationship of privity exists
prior to th.e commencement of the action."
"In the -usual situation privity arises upon
paym.ent to the insured, at which time the insurer
acquires a legal or equitable interest in an "indivisible" cause of action. ·The insurer's interest
is derived from· and in privity with the· insured
and what he receives is not an interest in litigation, so as to make him a technical "privy" to a
pending action, but a portion of a single claim
which is no better than his predecessor possessed.
If a man bought the wrong half of a horse he
should not complain what his predecessor does
with the other half, nor should his predicament
force the courts to decide twice who should feed
it with possibly contrary and embarrassing results. The failure to apply estoppel to the assignee in the insurance field has produced equally
absurd situation.s~
As to estoppel, the Court states at Pag~ 927, after
fully reviewing the law,
~'here,

as in practically all such situations,
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the assignees \vere fully aware of the pendency
of the actions by the injured parties. The assignees had a right to participate in their assignors'
actions and having failed to exercise that right
th~y tnuy not co1nplain irresp~ctive of the outrome of the principal cases.
The OhiQ Courts, however, have unnecessarily (we
fct'l) inereascd their own difficulties, by holding that
tlw det'Pndant can interplead the insurer; that the insurer
has a separate cause of action; that a single cause may
not be split: and that an insurer who does not enter
into its in~ured's suit to protect its subrogation interest~, is estopped from bringing the separate cause of
action.
Thi~

confusion is reviewed in an excellent opinion
by a lo,ver court of Ohio, citing many cases in Appellant's Brief, in Dubose v. Lowe, 189 NE2'd 923 .
.. The problem ... of the effect of a judgment
(on an insurer's subrogation rights) have plagued
Ohio Courts for some time."
HDespite the augustness of the authority,
this Court finds the rule (permitting a second
suit by the insurer) unnecessarily broad. It cannot be reconciled with the historic and logical
basis for the single cause of action rule ... that
a tort feasor should not be harassed with a multiplicity of suits. Literally read, the Supreme
Court's language . . . could mean that if the injured party had had several insurance companies
... the tort feasor could be subjected to separate
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suits by the injured party and by each of the
subrogated insurance companies ... very possibly
with inconsistent results."
The issue should be determined on the basis
of knowledge."
1

_

"

In General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.,
v. Sircey, 354 Mich. 478, 93 N.W.2d 315, the facts are
squarely in point with the case at bar. Auto Owner's
Ins. Co. insured Sircey for collision. Sircey sued for
his personal injuries, but not including the insurer's subrogation interest. Auto Owners knew of the litigation,
but did not intervene or join because of the receipt
of the following letter from defendant's insurer, General
Accident:
"Until some disposition has been made of the
injury claims, we can make no commitment as to
your subrogation claim.
When the injury claims are out of the way, we
shall be pleased to discuss this matter with you
further.''
Jury verdict was against Sircey, no cause for action,
in the personal injury action, and Auto Owner's denied
the subrogation claim of General Accident, who then
brought the above suit.
- The Michigan Court upheld the lower ·Court's dismissal, saying:
"Appellant did not request a waiver of the
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def(·nse of split cause of action, and neither appellee nor Auto Owner's agreed to a waiver.
Appellee did not request appellant to delay in
partaking its subrogation claim. Appellant's
claim of waiver because of correspondence is not
sustained by the record.''
Plaintiff, in its Brief, attempts to explain away
thl~ ·"'irccy case, (supra), by stating that case was in
law, and not equity. In the later case of Flanary v.
RestTVC 1nsurance Company1 364 Mich. 73, 110 NW 2d
tiiO, ( 1961), The Court States :
HAppellant's claim that the c·ourt erred in
not transferring the case to Equity has not only
been answered by this opinion but, also, by previous decisions of this ·Court, and further discussion on this point would be an imposition on bench
and bar."

In the Flanary case, plaintiff sued his collision
earrier, Reserve. He also filed suit No. 2, for personal
injuries only, and this suit was settled while the suit
~o. 1 \vas pending. Reserve moved to dismiss suit
Xo. 1, on the ground of splitting. Reserve did not
know of the personal injury suit, or the settlement, until
aftt'r settlen1ent.
The opinion states; in ruling for the insurer:
"In settling, plaintiff precluded himself from
thereafter taking the position that he had been
paid ~nly for personal injuries and suing Fenton
f~r .his car loss. In so doing he also precluded
lus Insurer . . . from so doing."
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Sibson v. Roberts Express, Inc. (1962,) 104 NH 192, :
182 A2d 449, follows the great majority of cases in
refusing to allow a second suit by an insurer who refused to protect their interests in their insured's personal injury suit, saying:

"The agreed facts establish that the insurer's .
conduct was deliberately chosen with knowledge
of the pending suit."
In accord: Coniglio v. Wyoming Valley Fire Ins. Co.,
3-37 Mich. 38, 59 NW2d 74.
POINT TWO
PLAINTIFF INSURER IS ESTOPPED BY ITS
ACTIONS FROM BRINGING THIS LAW SUIT.

'The rule against splitting, of course has its exceptions where the defendant consents, or where the plaintiff did not enter the first suit "by accident, excusable
neglect, mistake or fraud of the adversary, and without
fault of the pleader . . ." Bancroft Code Pleading,
(supra) Sec. 389, pg. 1516. None of the above exceptions
are present in this case.
The appellant must have tongue in cheek when it
claims that it was mislead into electing not to enter
the tort action, or that after all, Homer Bray was acting
as agent for Hi-Line. By so claiming, the agreement
stated in the stipulation must be reWlorded, and so must
the letters between the two insurance companies.
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Par. 11 of the Stipulation of Facts says:

"The understanding ... was that ... Central
Casualty would pay to Miller's Mutual ... "
Hi-Line knew absolutely nothing of this arrangen1ent. Does .Appellant now want this Court to find that
Central Casualty actually agreed that Hi-Line personally
would pa.y the claim, when Hi-Line had insurance coverage 1 Look at the Millers' letter to Homer Bray:
we are ... now looking to Central Casualty Company for reimbursement ... "
H •••

.. . . . kindly advise us whether Central 'Casualty \vill give due consideration to our subroga. c1rum
. .•. "
t10n
.. In the absence of some assurance that Central Casualty will consider o~r subrogation claim
... et c. "

Furthermore, Central Casualty had, no authority to
bind Hi-Line to personal liability without its knowledge
and consent.

Hilker r. Western Auto Ins. Co. 204 Wis. 1, 231
X.\V. 257.
''The Power of settlement given the insurer
cannot be used fo~ the p-qrposes of fraud or oppression . . . the power conferred must not be
exercised in bad faith."
.. The rule is fundamental that a person may
not act as the agent of another where his interests are adverse to those of his principal, without
the full knowledge and consent of his principaL"

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
·The agreement by Millers' with Central. was solely
for the benefit of the insurance companies (Stipulation r.
par. 12), and of absolutely no benefit to Hi-Line. By . .
that agreement, Millers' saved attorney's fees and costs ·:~:
of court. The Receivership of Central Casualty must
not have been more of a surprise to ·Millers' than HiLine, and Millers' effort to. transfer their bad bargain
to defendant should not be countenanced.
". . . the agreed facts establish that the insurer's conduct was deliberately chosen with
knowledge of the pending suit." Sibson v. Roberts
Exprses, Inc. (N.H.) supra.
Millers' Mutual, like all insurance companies, are
manned by competent adjusters and attorneys, and the
fears expressed in plaintiff's Brief over the difficulties
the companies might face in subrogation actions if tortfeasors are not to be subjected to several suits, can
easily be solved.
But be that as it may, that is not the proble~ presented in this case. We can certainly allay appellant's
fears. on future situations where they are invited to join
in their insured's suit. Our legal advise is to either
1. .Join in the suit, and pay a pro-rata share of
the costs and attorneys fees.
2. ~secure a binding agreement from the defendant's insurer, and abide by the agreement, but
first get a financial report.
3. If it is desired to file a separate tort action,
get a written consent from the defendant per-
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sonally, waiving his rights not to be harrassed
twice by the same cause of action.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment entered in favor of Defendant should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LO·UIS E. MID·GLEY

Attorney for DefendantRespondent
415 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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